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1 What is fairness?
Fairness is a broad concept, covering a range of qualifications such as impartiality,
courtesy, equity, sportsmanship, etc. Here, we focus on fairness in exchanging (elec-
tronic) goods, stipulating that none of the partners can take an undue advantage over the
other. When is an interaction between two or more people called fair? Let us proceed
with a few examples which reflect fairness as it is understood in the security literature.
Our examples, as the cryptographic tradition goes, are scenarios involving Alice and
Bob. To learn more about these people see [Gor05].
• Alice and Bob want to divide a piece of cake into two parts, one part for Alice
and one part for Bob. None of them trusts the other one for this purpose. Alice
gets to cut the cake into two pieces, and Bob gets to choose which part he wants.
It is in Alice’s interest to maximize the smallest piece of the two. This is because
a rational Bob would choose the bigger piece, leaving Alice with the smaller
piece. Alice, being a rational person too, prefers to cut the cake into halves.
• Alice takes a taxi. She, however, does not want to pay the driver Bob before
he takes her to her destination. Bob, not trusting Alice, does not want to take
Alice to her destination before she pays. The fee is 100 Euros. Alice rips a 100
Euro bill into halves, and gives a half to Bob. To receive the other half, it is now
in Bob’s interest to take Alice to her destination. Alice, however, has already
“spent” her 100 Euros, and does not benefit from not giving the other half to
Bob, once Bob takes her to her destination.
Do these scenarios describe fair interactions? We will analyze them more carefully
in the following. In the cut and choose scenario, indeed there is an assumption that
neither Alice nor Bob would take the whole cake and simply run away. Under this
assumption, cut and choose is fair, in the sense that Alice and Bob will both be content
with the result. None of them has any reason to envy the other one, cf. [BPW07].
In the taxi driver scenario, clearly Bob should take Alice to her destination to get
paid. Bob, however, knows that Alice has no interest in not paying him. She has
already ripped up her 100 Euro bill, and can as well give the other half to Bob, once
she is at her destination. 1 Here, Bob relying on the assumption that Alice is rational
would take Alice to her destination. Similarly, Alice under the assumption that Bob is
rational would rip up the 100 Euro bill. Remark that both parties need to assume that
their opponent is rational in this scenario. Indeed, a malicious Alice could harm Bob
by not paying him the other half, and a malicious Bob could harm Alice by not taking
her to her destination after she has ripped the bill.
Note that no such rationality assumption is needed to ensure fairness in the cut and
choose scenario. If Alice cuts the cake unfairly, it is only Alice who is in a disadvan-
tage. In other words, both Alice and Bob are guaranteed to end up with at least half of
the cake, without any assumptions on the rationality of the other party; Alice however
must play rational to ensure that she gets at least a half.
These examples show that fairness is indeed a subtle issue. In the following, we
abstract away various non-technical aspects of fairness, and focus on fairness in elec-
tronic exchanges.
2 Fairness in electronic exchanges
At a high level of abstraction, an action, such as signing a contract, may be considered
as a single event even though it is made up of a number of more elementary actions. We
say that the execution of such a composed action is atomic if either all of its sub-actions
are executed, or none at all.
Applying this terminology to electronic exchanges, we understand fairness as the
basic property of atomicity, meaning that all parties involved in the interaction receive
a desired item in exchange for their own, or none of them does so. The exchange of
items is often governed by a set of rules, stating which steps are taken in which order
and by whom. Such a set of rules is referred to as a protocol. Fairness here is thus
a property of the means of the exchange, e.g. a protocol, rather than the exchanged
material per se.
The difference between electronic exchange and conventional commerce and barter
essentially lies in enforceable laws. If Alice pays for a product to Bob and Bob fails to
deliver the product (as stated in their contract), then Alice can resort to litigation, which
is enforceable by law. In electronic commerce, however, litigation is often not viable.
This is because laws to evaluate and judge based on electronic documents are mostly
inadequate, the exchange partners may be subject to different laws (e.g. they may live
in different countries) and, more importantly, the accountable real world party behind
an electronic agent may not be traceable, cf. [San97].
The current practice of electronic commerce, therefore, heavily relies on trusted
third parties. Most vendors on Internet, for instance, offer little beyond browsing their
catalogues, while contract signing and payment often go via a credit card company. The
trust in these sites is largely built upon the trust users have in the credit card companies,
which keep records and provide compensation in case of fraud. Fairness in electronic
commerce in fact turns out to be unachievable if there is no presumed trust among the
involved parties [EY80]; see Section 3.2. We thus focus on fair exchange protocols
which rely on trustees.
When there is a mediator who is trusted by all the exchange partners, there is a
canonical solution to fair exchange. The items subject to exchange can be sent to
the trusted entity and then he would distribute them if all the items arrive in time. If
some items do not arrive in time, the mediator would simply abandon the exchange.
Figure 1 shows such an exchange. In the first phase, A sends iA to the mediator T
and B sends iB to T . Here iA and iB are the items subject to exchange. In the next
phase, T sends iB to A and iA to B. This mechanism is inefficient, as it involves the
mediator in every exchange, and therefore does not scale well. The involvement of
the trusted party can in fact be reduced to the point that he would need to take actions
only when something goes amiss in the exchange (e.g. an item does not arrive in time).
Such protocols are preferred when most exchange partners are honest and, thus, failed
exchanges are infrequent; hence these protocols are called optimistic protocols.




Figure 1: Exchange using a trusted mediator
2.1 Fair exchange flavors
Various flavors of the fair exchange (FE) problem exist in the literature, e.g. fair con-
tract signing (CS), fair payment (FP), fair certified email (CEM), and fair exchange of
secrets (ES). Below, we introduce these FE variants via examples:
• Fair contract signing (CS): Alice and Bob have agreed on a contract and would
like to sign it electronically. 2 Alice gives her signature on the contract to Bob
only if she receives the contract signed by Bob. Similarly, Bob signs the contract
and passes it to Alice, only if he receives Alice’s signature. In short, they want
to simultaneously exchange their signatures.
• Fair payment (FP): Alice sees Bob’s electronic book on the Internet and wants
to buy it, but she does not want to send her digital coins to Bob before receiving
the book and making sure that it is indeed what he has advertised. Similarly, Bob
does not want to send his electronic book to Alice before receiving Alice’s coins
and making sure that they are genuine. They want to simultaneously exchange
their digital items.
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• Fair certified email (CEM): Alice wants to send an email to Bob in exchange for a
receipt. The receipt is a proof that shows Bob has received the email. Therefore,
the receipt must uniquely identify the content of the email. Bob is in turn willing
to send back the receipt to Alice only if he actually receives Alice’s email. Notice
that in this case, Alice and Bob do not aim at simultaneous exchange. This is
because of the inherent asymmetry of the problem, namely the receipt depends
on the content of the email.
• Fair exchange of secrets (ES): Alice and Bob each possess a secret that is not
known to the other one. Alice and Bob would like to exchange their secrets, but
neither of them wants to reveal their secret unilaterally. Note that this exchange
is meaningful only if Alice and Bob can recognize the expected secrets. That is,
they can verify that a received data is indeed the other party’s secret. Otherwise,
any protocol that distributes random bits would be acceptable, since Alice would
think that the junk is actually Bob’s secret, and similarly for Bob.
Although these problems are similar and we refer to them collectively as FE, there
are subtle differences between them. For instance, CEM and CS are different in simul-
taneity, and CEM is different from ES in that the receipt of an email is not precisely
defined in CEM, and can thus be different from one protocol to another (as it happens
to be in practice), while ES is to exchange the secrets themselves. It is also notable
that in ES the participants are assumed to be able to recognize the other party’s secret.
This is a trivial precondition when it comes to CS, because signatures are the subject
of exchange, and digital signatures always have a verification algorithm associated to
them.
Yet another class of FE protocols consists of the non-repudiation protocols (NR).
Their aim is to exchange evidences in a fair manner, meaning that Alice receives an
evidence of receipt iff Bob receives an evidence of origin on a certain document. An
evidence of receipt can for instance be formed by Bob signing a document that he has
received from Alice, and an evidence of of origin can be formed by Alice signing the
document she sends to Bob. The participants are further required to be accountable for
(i.e. they cannot deny) the promises they utter in the course of the exchange. We do
not distinguish NR and CEM protocols in this document, since these are conceptually
very similar. The challenge in NR protocols is to exchange the evidences in a fair
way, otherwise, non-repudiation of the evidences can be achieved using standard digital
signatures, cf. [ZG97b].
We remark that in fair contract signing, termination is a challenging problem in
practice. For instance consider the following scenario. A contract to sell a property P
for some amount of money M has a meaning only if it is seen by an authority, e.g. the
city hall, to transfer the ownership of the property to the buyer. In this situation, the
seller can sign the following statement and send it to the buyer.
The seller declares that if the buyer signs this letter, then the buyer will
own the property P , and the buyer thereby promises to transfer M dollars
to the account of the seller.
Now, the buyer cannot have the property P without pledging to pay M dollars to the
seller; this exchange is thus fair.
The above solution for fairness, however, leaves the seller in a disadvantageous
position regarding the termination of the exchange. Namely, the buyer can sign the
statement whenever he wishes. Meanwhile, the seller is the owner of the property only
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in a weak sense. The seller cannot sell the property to anyone else, and does not know
when the property is not his anymore. Nevertheless, the seller knows that if some
day the property is owned by the buyer, the seller is eligible to the amount of money
mentioned in the statement. This example motivates the timeliness requirement for fair
exchange protocols, as described below.
2.2 Fair exchange requirements
In the literature, there is no consensus on what FE protocols (or its variants) have
to provide. Nevertheless, most authors seem to include formulations of fairness and
timeliness similar to the ones proposed by [Aso98]. Below, we informally describe
these goals for two parties, named A and B:
• Fairness states that if A terminates the protocol in a state where A has B’s item,
then when B terminates the protocol, B has A’s item, and vice versa. This
property is often referred to as strong fairness, cf. [PVG03].
• Timeliness states that any honest participant can terminate the exchange unilat-
erally, i.e. without any help from the opponent. Timeliness guarantees that none
of the participants can arbitrarily force the other one to wait for the termination
of the exchange.
Any protocol that achieves these goals is said to solve FE. 3
We remark that each variant of FE can have its own specific requirements. For
instance, timeliness is sometimes deemed unnecessary for CEM, e.g. see [Mic03].
See [BVV84] for a formal study on the relations among the requirements of the FE
variants mentioned above.
3 Solvability of fair exchange
In this section, we focus on solvability of the FE problem, thus focusing on questions
such as: in which network settings can fair exchange be achieved? How many mali-
cious parties can subvert a fair exchange protocol among n parties? etc. We start with
a general introduction to security protocols, and then consider the solvability of FE
in synchronous and asynchronous settings. No trusted entity is assumed in studying
solvability in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
3.1 Security protocols
A distributed system consists of a finite number of participants that interact by some
communication primitives, such as sending and receiving messages, accessing a shared
memory, etc. Below, we assume communications take place solely through sending
and receiving messages over communication channels. A collection of communication
channels is called a communication network. We write
A → B : m,
when participant A submits message m to the communication network, with the in-
tention that it should be delivered to participant B. A synchronous channel guarantees
to deliver messages in a timely manner, with a pre-known time bound, while asyn-
chronous channels deliver messages eventually, but no time bounds are put on them.
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Channels may in general lose, duplicate or distort messages. Unless explicitly stated,
we do not consider such faulty channels. 4
A protocol assigns an algorithm to each participant. The algorithms may use the
communication primitives that are available to the participants to achieve a certain
common goal. A synchronous protocol assumes that the participants execute their
algorithms in lock-step, i.e. there is a common clock available to all the participants,
and that the communication channels are synchronous. Asynchronous protocols do
however not assume these properties. A fault tolerant protocol achieves its goal even
if some of the participants are faulty.
Different failure models are used in distributed systems to characterize how a faulty
participant may misbehave. One of the simplest models is crash failure, in which the
failed participant simply dies, i.e. ceases to act afterwards. In the Byzantine failure
model [LSP82], a faulty participant may deviate from the algorithm assigned to it in
any fashion, but its view is local and its effects are local, i.e. it only sees what is passed
to it by its neighbors, and it can only send messages to its neighbor participants.
Cryptographic or security protocols are fault tolerant protocols which use cryptog-
raphy to attain their goals. In computer security, the Dolev-Yao model [DY81, DY83],
denoted DY , is usually considered as the hostile environment model. 5. In this model,
there is one malicious participant (called attacker, intruder, saboteur, etc.), comprising
all the outsider and insider corrupted parties, which has control over the entire com-
munication network. 6 It intercepts all messages that have been transmitted and can
store them in its knowledge set. It can also remove or delay messages in favor of others
being communicated. “[It] is a legitimate user of the network, and thus in particular
can initiate a conversation with other users” [DY83]. Security protocols are typically
designed to protect the interests of the honest participants, i.e. those who faithfully fol-
low the protocol, in presence of the DY attacker. Honest participants only follow the
protocol, and, in general, are not required to take any steps to detect or thwart attacks.
Protocols must thus be designed to guarantee that, if a participant follows the rules of
the protocol, then his interests are protected.
TheDY attacker can be seen as a Byzantine participant which is sitting in the center
of a star-like network topology. All other participants therefore communicate through
DY , hence the network being of connectivity 1. 7 Network connectivity indeed plays a
role in the possibility of distributed tasks, performed in presence of malicious parties,
see [FLM86, Syv97].
3.2 Solvability of fair exchange in synchronous systems
Even and Yacobi [EY80], and independently Rabin [Rab81], studied simple variants of
the FE problem. In [EY80], a notion of mutual signature on a message (the CS prob-
lem) is studied. They informally reason that “if the judicator is not active during the
ordinary operation of the system”, then no two-party protocol can achieve agreement,
where agreement means that when a party can compute the signature, the other one can
also do so. Their argument goes as: “Assume that, after n communications, [Alice]
has sufficient information for efficient calculation of [the mutual signature], but that
this is not true for n − 1 communications. We conclude that [Bob] transmits the nth
communication, and therefore the first time [Bob] has sufficient information is after n′
communications, where n′ 6= n. This contradicts [the definition of agreement]”.
Rabin considers the similar problem of simultaneous exchange of secrets between
two non-trusting entities Alice and Bob (the ES problem). He deduces that the problem
is unsolvable: “Any [exchange] protocol must have the form: Alice gives to Bob some
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information I1, Bob gives to Alice J1, Alice gives to Bob I2, etc. There must exist a
first k such that, say, Bob can determine [Alice’s secret] from I1, . . . , Ik, while Alice
still cannot determine [Bob’s secret] from J1, . . . , Jk−1. Bob can withhold Jk from
Alice and thus obtain [Alice’s secret] without revealing [his own secret]”.
Since these problems are instances of FE, their unsolvability implies unsolvabil-
ity of FE in the corresponding models. Both these arguments clearly stress on the
malicious act of withholding the last message. They can thus be summarized as: No
two-party protocol with one Byzantine participant, even with synchronous commu-
nication channels, can solve FE. This result naturally carries over to asynchronous
protocols. We remark that a crucial feature of this model is that no party is trusted by
other participant(es). A participant is trusted iff it is publicly known that the participant
is (and remains) non-faulty. DeMilo, Lynch and Merritt formalized the impossibility
arguments mentioned above in [DLM82].
In [BOGW88] and, independently, in [CCD88], the authors derive general solvabil-
ity results regarding the secure multi-party computation (SMPC) problem, in complete
graph topologies (where every two nodes are connected). SMPC and FE, albeit be-
ing different problems, are tightly related. These results are therefore pertinent to our
discussion. In [BOGW88] it is established that, in a fully connected network of syn-
chronous channels, n-party SMPC, and thus FE, is achievable if there are at most t
Byzantine participants, with t < n
3
. They also prove that there exist SMPC problems
which, with t ≥ n
3
Byzantine participants, are unsolvable for n parties. The results
of [EY80, Rab81] clearly show that FE is one of these problems. See [GL02, Mau06]
for excellent reviews on further developments in SMPC.
We note that the possibility results of [BOGW88, CCD88] do not imply the solv-
ability of FE in the DY model, simply because the connectivity of the network is 1
in the DY model, while these results are stated in complete graph topologies. In fact,
reaching distributed consensus, a problem conceptually similar to FE, is impossible if
the network connectivity is less than 2t + 1, with t Byzantine participants [FLM86].
For a formal comparison between FE and distributed consensus in various models
see [OT08].
3.3 Solvability of fair exchange in asynchronous systems
In asynchronous systems, the impossibility result of [FLP85] and its extension [MW87]
imply that multi-party FE is unsolvable when at least one of the participants is subject
to crash failure. For two-party exchanges, this result has been derived in [PG99] by
reducing the distributed consensus problem to FE. It is worth mentioning that the im-
possibility results of [EY80, Rab81, DLM82] are based on the malicious act of with-
holding parts of information, whereas [PG99] prove impossibility of FE in the presence
of benign, but not “malicious”, failures, as a result of lack of knowledge to decide ter-
mination in asynchronous systems. These concern orthogonal difficulties in solving
FE, and none of them directly implies the other one.
Up until now, we focused on the effects of participant failures, as opposed to chan-
nel failures, on solving the FE problem. Below, we consider the case of lossy channels,
while assuming that participants are all honest (i.e. they faithfully follow their proto-
col). In distributed computing, the limitations on reaching agreement in the presence
of lossy channels is usually described using the generals paradox [Gra78]: “There are
two generals on campaign. They have an objective (a hill) that they want to capture.
If they simultaneously march on the objective they are assured of success. If only one
marches, he will be annihilated. The generals are encamped only a short distance apart,
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but due to technical difficulties, they can communicate only via runners. These mes-
sengers have a flaw, every time they venture out of camp they stand some chance of
getting lost (they are not very smart.) The problem is to find some protocol that allows
the generals to march together even though some messengers get lost.”
Gray informally argues that such a protocol does not exist [Gra78]. This has later
on been formally proved in, e.g., [YC79, HM84]. The generals problem can be reduced
to two-party FE by noticing that the generals can use a fair exchange protocol to agree
on a time for attack. The impossibility result stated above, thus, implies that FE is
unsolvable in the presence of channel failures, when participants are honest.
Furthermore in the presence of channel failures, “any protocol that guarantees that
whenever either party attacks the other party will eventually attack, is a protocol in
which necessarily neither party attacks” [HM84]. This result implies that, in optimistic
FE protocols, resilient channels are unavoidable even when all participants are honest.
A channels is resilient iff any message inserted into one end of the channel is eventually
delivered to the other end.
4 Fair exchange in the Dolev-Yao model
Fair exchange cannot be achieved in the presence of the DY attacker if there is no trust
in the system (see Section 3). Many fair exchange protocols thus assume the presence
of a trusted third party (TTP). The TTP is further assumed to be connected to protocol
participants through resilient channels. We come back to to this topic shortly. There are
three general constructions for FE, based on the degree of the involvement of trusted
third parties. The first group needs no TTPs, e.g. the protocols of [Blu81, Rab81,
EGL85, Cle90, BOGMR90, MR99]. See also [FGY92] for a chronological survey on
these protocols. These are based on gradual release of information or gradual increase
of privileges and require exchanging many messages to approximate fair exchange, as
deterministic asynchronous FE with no trusted parties is impossible (see Section 3).
The idea behind such gradual release protocols is that a party will only have a minimal
advantage if he decides to cheat.
Protocols of the second group need the TTP’s intervention in each exchange, e.g.
see [BT94, CTS95, ZG96a, ZG96b, DGLW96, FR97, AG02]. In the literature, these
are sometimes called protocols with in-line or on-line TTPs. On-line TTPs, although
being involved in each exchange, act only as a light-weight notary, as opposed to to in-
line TTPs which directly handle the items subject to exchange, cf. [ZG96c]. The pro-
tocols of the second group have a fixed, usually small, number of message exchanges,
and are thus more appealing in practice. However, the TTP can easily become a com-
munication bottleneck or a single target of attacks, as it is involved in each exchange.
Protocols of [Rab83, RS98] can also be listed in the second group as they require the
TTP to be active during each exchange. However, a slight difference is that, intu-
itively, the TTPs in the latter protocols need not “be aware” of being involved in such
exchanges. For instance, the TTP in Rabin’s protocol acts as a beacon, broadcasting
signals which can be used by others to perform fair exchange.
The third group of FE protocols, known as optimistic protocols, require the TTP’s
intervention only if failures, accidentally or maliciously, occur, e.g. see [Eve83, ZG97a,
ASW97, Mic97, ASW98a, ASW98b, BDM98, ZDB99, MK01, Mic03, PCS03, DR03,
CCT05, CTM07]. Therefore, honest parties that are willing to exchange their items
can do so without involving any TTP. Optimistic protocols are called protocols with
off-line TTPs since the TTP need not be active at the time the exchange goes on; the
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TTP can be contacted in a later time.
4.1 Optimistic fair exchange
We focus on asynchronous two-party optimistic exchange protocols. The DY model
is assumed for the attacker. The exchange partners A and B are connected via DY .
There is a trusted third party T , which is immune to failures. The TTP is connected
to A and B via resilient channels.
4.1.1 The resilient channel assumption
A channel between two participants is resilient iff any message inserted into one end
of the channel is eventually delivered to the other end. The resilience assumption is an
asymptotic restriction, i.e. messages are delivered eventually, but no bounds are placed
on the order or the time of delivering these messages.
As mentioned after the generals paradox in Section 3.3, in order to achieve timeli-
ness, fair exchange protocols need resilient channels. Intuitively, unilaterally terminat-
ing the exchange by a participant corresponds to marching to the hill by a general. A
general may safely march to the hill only if he knows the other general would do so.
Similarly, a participant may consider the exchange terminated only if she knows the
other participant would also do so.
In the DY model, however, the communication media are assumed to be under
complete control of the intruder. The DY intruder can in particular destroy transmitted
messages. For liveness properties, such as timeliness, to hold in theDY intruder model,
the assumption that the intruder does not disrupt (some of) the communication channels
must therefore be added.
Resilient channels are not readily available in most practical situations. Available
faulty channels can nonetheless be used to provide resilience, as described below. As-
suming resilient channels in security protocol thus helps us to abstract from the under-
lying mechanisms which actually provide resilience.
There are various ways to construct resilient channels from faulty ones. Let us as-
sume that A and B are connected with a faulty channel c which may lose, duplicate and
reorder messages. To distinguish c from a channel that is only temporarily available,
we assume that there is a bound on the number of messages that c can discard. We say
that a channel is fair lossy iff any message which is inserted to one end of the channel
an infinite number of times is delivered to the other end of the channel an infinite num-
ber of times. 8 If c is a fair lossy channel, which may duplicate and reorder messages,
then retransmission and tagging allow A and B to construct a reliable FIFO channel on
top of c, e.g. see Stenning’s protocol [Ste76, Lyn96].
In the DY intruder model, it is assumed that the only possible means of commu-
nication between A and B is DY . The DY intruder, however, need not be a fair lossy
medium and can destroy all the messages that are transmitted through it. Therefore,
no reliable channel may be constructed between A and B in the DY model. Never-
theless, the assumption that DY controls all communication media between A and B
is often impractical. For instance, in wireless networks, given that jamming is only
locally sustainable, A and B can always move to an area where they can send and
receive messages. Ultimately, two principals who fail to properly establish a chan-
nel over computer networks can resort to other communication means, such as various
postal services. These services, albeit being orders of magnitude slower than computer







Figure 2: Generic four message protocol
We thus postulate that any A and B who are willing to communicate can eventually
establish a (fair lossy) channel, despite DY’s obstructions. To add this postulation to
the DY model, weakening DY to the extent that it behaves as a fair lossy channel is
adequate. This is the essence of the resilient channels assumption.
4.1.2 The structure of optimistic protocols
We opt for a high level description that underlines the exchange patterns. Exact mes-
sage contents are abstracted away, and all messages are assumed to contain enough
information for protocol participants to distinguish different protocol instantiations,
and different roles in protocols. Detailed specification of these issues is orthogonal to
our current purpose.
Optimistic protocols typically consist of three sub-protocols: the main or optimistic
sub-protocol, the abort sub-protocol and the recovery sub-protocol. Figure 2 depicts a
generic main sub-protocol between A and B. The regions in which the other two sub-
protocols are alternative possibilities are numbered (1–4) in the figure. In the main sub-
protocol, that does not involve the TTP, the agents first commit to release their items and
then they actually release them. The items subject to exchange, and commitments are
respectively denoted by iA, iB and cA(iA), cB(iB). In Figure 2 we have m1 = cA(iA),
m2 = cB(iB), m3 = iA and m4 = iB . If no failures occur, the participants exchange
their items successfully using the main sub-protocol.
If an expected message does not arrive in time, or the arrived message does not
conform to the protocol, then the participant expecting that message can resort to the
TTP using abort or recovery sub-protocols. These sub-protocols help the participant
to reach a fair state and subsequently terminate. Here we introduce the notion of re-
solve patterns, which is useful in describing optimistic FE protocols. Consider again
the generic four message protocol shown in Figure 2. A resolve pattern determines
which of the abort and resolve sub-protocols are available to participants when they
are waiting for a message from their opponent in the main sub-protocol; namely, the
alternative sub-protocols envisaged for points 1, 2, 3 and 4 in Figure 2.
Four different symbols can be assigned to a point in the resolve pattern: abort (a),
recovery (r), quit (q), and none (−). Intuitively, occurrence of the symbol a means
that at that point the participant can initiate an abort sub-protocol, thereby requesting
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the TTP to abort the exchange protocol. Likewise, occurrence of an r means that the
participant can initiate a recovery sub-protocol, thereby requesting the TTP to help him
recover from a situation in which it has received a commitment from the other partici-
pant without having received the other participant’s item. Occurrence of a q means that
in case the expected message does not arrive in time, the participant can safely quit the
exchange without contacting the TTP. Naturally, if no message has been exchanged,
the participant quits the protocol, e.g. B in Figure 2 quits the exchange if he does not
receive the first message in time. A ‘none’ option (−) indicates that the participant
has no alternatives but following the optimistic protocol. It turns out that ‘none’ op-
tions undermine termination of asynchronous optimistic FE protocols. This is intuitive
because participants may crash and never send the message their opponent is waiting
for. When communicating with the TTP (using resolve sub-protocols), however, par-
ticipants know that the message they send to and expect to receive from the TTP will
be delivered in a finite time. This is due to resilience of the channels, and the fact that
the TTP is immune to failures (see TTP assumptions, above).
We use tuples for representing resolve patterns. For instance, a resolve pattern for
the protocol of Figure 2 can be (q, a, r, r), listing the symbols attached to points 1, 2, 3
and 4, respectively.
The resolve sub-protocols (abort/recovery) involve the TTP. In order to simplify
the reasoning we assume that the participant sends its message history (all messages
sent and received up to now by the participant in the current execution of the protocol)
to the TTP, and based on these the TTP either returns an abort token A, or a recovery
token R. Token A often has no intrinsic value; it merely indicates that the TTP will
never send an R token in the context of the current exchange. Token R should however
help a participant to recover to a fair state. Although it is impossible for B alone to
derive the item iA from the commitment cA(iA) (and similar for iB), it is often assumed
that the TTP can generate iA from cA(iA), and iB from cB(iB), and that R contains
iA and iB . In case the TTP cannot do so, usually an affidavit from the TTP is deemed
adequate, cf. weak fairness [PVG03]. The resilient channels guarantee that, in case of
failures, protocol participants can ultimately consult the TTP.
Participant A can run the recovery protocol if the opponent B has committed to ex-
change, but A has not received B’s item, and vice versa. A participant aborts (cancels)












Figure 3: Abstract Mealy machine of TTP
The TTP logic matching the resolve pattern (q, a, r, r) for the protocol of Figure 2
is shown in Figure 3. For each exchanged item, the finite state (Mealy) machine of the
TTP is initially in the undisputed state sU. If the TTP receives a valid abort request
(from A) while being at state sU, then it sends back an abort token, and moves to
aborted state sA. Similarly, if the TTP is in state sU, and receives a valid resolve
request (from either A or B), then it sends back R, containing iA and iB , and moves to
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recovered state sR. When the TTP is in either of sA or sR states, no matter it receives
an abort or a recovery request on this exchange, it consistently replies with A or R,
respectively. 9
In state sR, the TTP typically stores R (which contains iA and iB). This is because,
if B sends a recovery request, and then A sends an abort request, the TTP needs to send
back R to A. However, the TTP needs cB(iB) to generate iB , and thus construct R.
An abort request by A nevertheless does not contain cB(iB). Therefore, once the TTP
computes R for an exchange, it stores R in its secure storage, for possible future uses.
In Figure 3, a and r stand for valid abort and recovery requests, while A and R stand for
the corresponding abort and recovery tokens, respectively. Remark that depending on
the current state of the TTP a participant may receive an abort token A even if it sends
a resolve request r to the the TTP, and vice versa.
5 A selective literature review
Below, we review some of the main ideas and results on solving the FE problem in the
DY model. This review is selective. In particular, we do not touch upon various FE
protocols that were developed to go beyond fair exchange requirements and satisfy an
extended set of functional or security goals (some of these are however discussed in
subsequent sections). Synchronous protocols are also mostly absent from our review.
For general surveys on the topic see several Ph.D. dissertations that have been written
on this topic, e.g. [Aso98, Sch00, Cha03, Kre03, Nen05, Gon05, Oni06, Tor08].
Generatable and revocable items. Pivotal to the working of optimistic protocols is
the nature of the items that are subject to exchange. It has been shown in [SW02]
that optimistic FE is impossible if the exchanged items are neither generatable nor
revocable. In general, no such restriction applies to FE protocols with in-line or on-
line TTPs though. An item is generatable if the TTP can generate the item from a
participant’s commitment to release that item, and an item is revocable if the TTP
can revoke the validity of that item. In general, digital items are neither generatable
nor revocable. However, cryptographic tools, such as verifiable encryption, can make
certain digital items generatable. For instance, see [ASW98b, Che98, PCS03, DR03,
Ate04, DJH07] for techniques to enable the TTP to generate participants’ signatures
from their commitments; see also [RR00]. In contrast, there are not many digital items
that can be revoked by the TTP (see below).
The above-mentioned impossibility result of [SW02] comes as no surprise when
noticing that if a wronged Bob resorts to the TTP, he wishes (at least) one of the fol-
lowing services: Either the TTP can generate the item that he has expected, which is
impossible if the item is not generatable, or the TTP can revoke the item that he has lost
(i.e. currently being in the possession of Alice), which is impossible if the item is not
revocable. The TTP can however provide Bob with an affidavit declaring that Bob has
indeed been cheated (by Alice). In this case, Bob only achieves weak fairness [Aso98],
which might not satisfy Bob. Below, we explore how such affidavits can be used to
provide strong fairness in CS, CEM and NR protocols.
The goal is to provide strong fairness without using costly cryptographic tools such
as verifiable encrypted signatures. The idea is to exploit a freedom that is inherent
to the definitions of CS, CEM and NR. In these FE variants, the protocol (designer)
is free to define what constitutes, e.g., a mutually signed contract, a signed receipt,
or evidence of origin. Therefore, these protocols devise dispute resolution procedures
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to evaluate (or interpret) the digital assets that are collected in the protocol. Dispute
resolution procedures can thereby be tailored to grade affidavits from the TTP as, for
instance, a valid evidence of origin. This idea has been used in many FE protocols
such as [ZG97a, ASW98a, ZDB99, KMZ02, GRV05, CCT05, CTM07]. Note that
these protocols enforce the structure of the exchanged items, hence being called inva-
sive [ASW98a]. Non-invasive protocols are more favorable, but come at high computa-
tion costs, as they rely on heavy cryptographic tools, as in, e.g., the signature exchange
protocols of [ASW98b].
A partial remedy to invasiveness is to make the TTP invisible [Mic97], so that there
would not be any difference between the evidences collected in optimistic runs and
those issued by the TTP. Note that the structure of the evidences is still determined
by the protocol, hence the result may be an invasive protocol (e.g. as in [Mic03]).
However, the exchanged items would not reveal whether the TTP was involved in the
exchange or not. For protocols with invisible, or transparent, TTPs see, e.g., [Mic97,
ASW98a, MK01, MS02, Mic03, Ate04]. As is phrased by Asokan, “typically, non-
invasiveness implies invisibility of third party” [Aso98].
Now we turn to fair exchange of revocable items. Generally, it is hard to revoke
digital items. However, certain payment systems can in principle provide revocable
coins, e.g. see [JY96, Vog03]. Fair payment protocols which employ revocable money
(orders) are presented in [ASW98a, Vog03]. A separate group of protocols for ex-
changing revocable items exploits the freedom in the definition of CS, CEM and NR,
just as mentioned earlier. These not only prescribe a tailored dispute resolution proce-
dure to grade the TTP’s messages as valuable evidences, but they also require the TTP
to in some situations participate in the dispute resolution phase of the protocol in order
to revoke evidences collected by the participants. Examples of protocols following this
idea are [Eve83, FPH00, FPH02, MD02, Zho04, WBZ04, FPH04]. These protocols
require three messages in their exchange sub-protocols, compared to optimistic proto-
cols for generatable items that require four messages. It has been shown in [Sch00] that
three messages is the minimum number of messages in exchange sub-protocols, given
that the TTP is allowed to participate in the dispute resolution phase, while this num-
ber is four if the TTP is not allowed to do so. Requiring the TTP’s intervention in the
evidence verification phase can be a drawback for these protocols because evidences
carry no weight until the TTP declares that they have not been revoked. 10
Idempotent and non-idempotent items. Most FE protocols assume that the items
subject to exchange are idempotent [Aso98], meaning that receiving or possessing an
item once is the same as receiving it multiple times. For example, once Alice gets
access to Bob’s signature on a contract, receiving it again some time later does not
add anything to Alice’s knowledge. The idempotency assumption reflects the mass
reproducibility of digital items. However, there exist protocols for exchanging digital
non-idempotent items. Electronic vouchers [FKT+99, FE03] are prominent examples
of non-idempotent items. Depending on the implementation, right tokens in digital
rights management systems can as well be considered as digital non-idempotent items,
e.g. see [CIK+06, TKJ08]. The current approach to securely use non-idempotent items
is to limit their distribution to trusted computing devices, which are nowadays becom-
ing more prevalent. Protocols for handling non-idempotent items, being FE protocols
or not, usually require that items are neither created nor destroyed in the course of
the protocol, e.g. see [FKT+99, TIHF04]. This resembles the money atomicity prop-
erty in electronic commerce, stating that money is neither destroyed nor generated in
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exchanges [Tyg96].
Using trusted devices in FE is not limited to exchanging non-idempotent items.
These are used for exchanging idempotent items as well, mainly in order to increase
protocols’ efficiency or flexibility. Examples are [Tor09] to reduce the number of mes-
sages to three in the optimistic sub-protocol, [VPG01] for exchanging time-sensitive
items, and [TMH06] for optimistic exchange of non-revocable, non-generatable items;
recall that optimistic FE requires that at least one of the items be either revocable or
generatable [SW02]. 11 See also [AV04, AGGV05, ES05, FFD+06, GR06] on using
trusted devices in FE.
Bounds on the number of messages. The premise of optimistic FE is that failures
are infrequent, and consequently fallback sub-protocols are executed rarely. There-
fore, a meaningful measure of efficiency in these protocols is the number of messages
exchanged in the main optimistic sub-protocol. Several results regarding optimal effi-
ciency of asynchronous two-party optimistic CS and CEM protocols have been derived
in [PSW98, Sch00]. The main results regarding the optimal number of messages in
exchange sub-protocols are mentioned above, namely three messages when the TTP
is allowed to intervene in the dispute resolution phase, and four messages otherwise.
Therefore, protocols which require only three messages in the exchange sub-protocol
and do not rely on TTP’s intervention in the dispute resolution phase do not satisfy
the requirements of fair exchange. For instance, the protocols of [Mic03], with three
messages in the main sub-protocol, do not provide timeliness.
Fair exchange between trusted devices requires three messages in the optimistic
protocol when the items subject to exchange are idempotent [Tor09]. For exchang-
ing non-idempotent items three messages in the optimistic sub-protocol are sufficient,
given that the trusted devices have access to an unlimited secure storage; otherwise,
four messages in the optimistic sub-protocol are sufficient and necessary [Tor09]. These
results are summarized in Table 1. Note that exchanging non-idempotent among non-



















trusted (unlimited secure storage) 3 3
trusted (limited storage) 4 3
Table 1: Optimal number of messages in two-party optimistic sub-protocol
It is shown [PSW98, Sch00] that the TTP needs to be stateful, i.e. to keep states of
disputed exchanges, to guarantee fairness in asynchronous optimistic protocols. From
a practical point of view, this result is of great relevance. Optimistic FE not only re-
quires TTPs for recovering from unfair transient states, it needs TTPs which maintain
persistent databases, containing the states of disputed exchanges, for virtually an indef-
inite amount of time. Naturally, in long runs, TTPs may crash or be compromised. 12
Mechanisms to limit the damages of these defects are described below. Before that,
we remark that the optimistic protocols with stateless TTPs are either unfair, such
as [Mic03, Ate04, NZB04] which do not provide timeliness 13, or rely on synchronous
communication channels, such as [ES05].
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Accountability and robustness of the trustee. Malicious TTPs can inevitably sub-
vert an exchange protocol; this is indeed the definition of trusted parties [And01]. To
demotivate malicious TTPs from cheating on protocol participants, Asokan introduces
protocols in which TTPs are verifiable [Aso98]. Given that corrupted TTPs do not
simply disappear, a protocol with verifiable TTP allows wronged participants to prove
TTP’s misbehavior to an external court. Accountability is thus a prohibition mecha-
nism, relying on the assumption that a TTP prefers not being detected as malicious.
This is a tenable assumption because external courts might be able to impose financial
penalties on the TTP, the TTP may be concerned about its reputation, etc. Verifiability
and transparency of TTPs are however not mutually attainable as is noted by Asokan,
e.g. see [GJM99] for a concrete protocol where these two requirements clash.
To reduce the dependency of protocols on availability and sanity of a single trusted
party, distributed TTPs can be used. In [AdG01] parts of the TTP’s work are dele-
gated to intermediary semi-trusted agents to reduce the TTP’s burden, and in [SXL05,
RRN05] secret sharing schemes are used so that, to subvert the protocol, an attacker
needs to compromise several TTPs. Note that distributed TTPs in general need to
run some atomic commit protocol to ensure the consistency of their (distributed) state.
We recall that (1) attaining fairness in optimistic asynchronous protocols is impossible
without stateful TTPs [Sch00], and (2) atomic commit protocols are nearly as expen-
sive as fair exchange [Tyg96, Tan96, LNJ01, AFG+04, RRN05]. Related to distributed
TTPs, Ito, Iwaihara and Kambayashi in [IIK02] assume that participants have limited
trust in TTPs and propose algorithms to determine if a rational agent would engage in
an exchange using cascades of TTPs.
In the context of fair exchange protocols in which the TTP is involved in every
exchange (online TTPs), Franklin and Reiter use a secret sharing scheme to limit what
a TTP can learn about exchanged materials [FR97]. They assume that the TTP does
not collude with any of the participants, but has its own interests in the matter.
Weaker notions of fairness. There are several alternatives to FE which do not need
TTPs at all, but can provide only a weak notion of fairness.
The concept of rational exchange of Syverson [Syv98] seeks to achieve fairness,
with no TTPs, assuming that the parties are rational, i.e. they try to maximize their
benefits. This assumption is in contrast to the pessimistic view prevalent in the security
community that honest parties should be protected even from self-damaging attackers.
The idea is “not to enforce compliance with the protocol, but to remove incentives to
cheat”, cf. [Jak95]. A few scenarios in which rational exchange can be of practical use
are mentioned in [Syv98]. See also the taxi-driver example of Section 1.
Game theory can provide valuable insights into the properties of exchange proto-
cols, when assuming that their participants are rational agents, rather than categorizing
them as malicious and honest parties, who blindly act regardless of their interests. For
more on this approach see [San97, SW02, IIK02, CMSS05, BHC04, IZS05, ADGH06,
TW07].
Concurrent signatures proposed in [CKP04], and further investigated in [SMZ04,
WBZ06, TSS06], provide a weak alternative to fair exchange. These generally do not
require any TTP interventions. The idea is that Alice and Bob produce two ambiguous
signatures which become bound to their corresponding signers only when a keystone
is released by Alice. The main shortcoming of the construct is that Bob has no control
over the termination of the protocol, and, moreover, Alice can secretly show Bob’s
signature to other parties before publishing the keystone; cf. the notion of abusefree
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protocols [GJM99]. A few scenarios in which this level of fairness is adequate are
mentioned in [CKP04].
Multiparty protocols. Multiparty fair exchange protocols are notoriously hard to
design and analysis. The early protocols, such as [Aso98, GM99], have mostly been
found flawed [CKS04, MR08a]. Mukhamedov and Ryan introduce a class of startling
attacks on multiparty CS, dubbed abort chaining attacks, which truly demonstrate the
subtlety of these protocols.
Minimal number of messages, although known for two party FE protocols [Sch00,
Tor09], in multi-party cases are under study. Building upon the idea of abort chaining
attacks it is shown by [MRT09] that an n-party asynchronous fair contract protocol re-
quires at least n2+1 messages in the optimistic sub-protocol. This result is obtained by
connecting the multiparty FE problem to the combinatorial problem of finding shortest
permutation sequences [Adl74].
Designing optimistic fair exchange protocols. To conclude this chapter, we point
out some of the resources which can be of use when designing FE protocols. Many of
the prudent advice [AN96] and attack scenarios known for authentication and key dis-
tribution protocols [Car94, CJ97] are pertinent to FE protocols as well. Papers specifi-
cally focusing on FE are unfortunately scarce.
We note that compilations of FE protocols are almost non-existent, [KMZ02] be-
ing a notable exception. New protocols are constantly devised with subtle differences
between their assumptions, methods and goals, thus making it difficult to oversee gen-
eral techniques. As of design methodologies, [Aso98, PVG03] discuss constructing
generic FE protocols and [GRV05] provides templates for conservative NR proto-
cols. The collections of attacks on NR and CEM protocols, presented respectively
in [Lou00] and [SWZ06], give designers an opportunity to assess their new protocols
against known attacks. These are however not well classified, and in particular flaws
stemming in the interaction between protocols and cryptographic apparatus used in
them are mostly omitted; see [DR03] for an example of such attacks on FE protocols.
There has been a considerable amount of work on formal verification of fair ex-
change protocols. See, for instance, the dissertations [Kre03, Tor08, Car09], and
also [SM02, GR03, KK05, KKW05, BP06, WH07, KKT07]. However, we are not
aware of any comprehensive guide or survey on existing formal techniques for verify-
ing FE protocols. This would be desirable for practitioners.
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Notes
1This of course does not imply that Alice would give the other half to Bob. Alice can choose not to pay,
as it will not change her profit vs. loss balance. Remark that if Alice can use the other half of the bill to
convince another taxi driver in a similar scenario later, indeed Alice would benefit from not giving the other
half to Bob. To avoid such situations, Bob must ensure that Alice rips a bill into two halves afresh.
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2Fair and private contract negotiation protocols are discussed in, e.g., [FA05].
3Fairness, as defined in this article, is a safety property, while timeliness is a liveness property. Intu-
itively, a safety properties states that something bad does not happen, while a liveness property stipulates
that something good will happen [AS85].
4As is described later, the attacker is modelled as a participant that can inject messages into the channels
and remove messages from (some of) the channels, even if the channels are assumed to be non-faulty.
5For a critique on the DY model in face of the emerging mobile ad-hoc protocols see, e.g., [Gli07]
6Any number of DY attackers can be modelled as a single DY attacker by merging their knowledge
sets [SM00].
7A network has connectivity c iff at least c nodes need to be removed to disconnect the network. In the
DY model removing the attacker node would disconnect the network.
8This corresponds to the strong loss limitation condition in [Lyn96]. A weaker variant of this requirement
states that if an infinite number of messages are sent to the channel, then some infinite subset of them are
delivered.
9Inconsistent (but correct) logics for the TTP have been used, e.g. in [MR08b], where the TTP may reply
R to a correct participant, after realizing that it has previously replied A to a malicious party.
10Such protocols are sometimes called non-monotonic [Ate04].
11The protocol of [VPG01] does not provide timeliness, as is pointed out in [Vog03], and the protocol
of [TMH06] is susceptible to a replay attack (we skip describing the attack, as it would require a detailed
description of the protocol, and the attack is also rather obvious). The ideas behind these protocols can
however be salvaged with some changes.
12The notion of compromisable trustee may seem to be paradoxical. We note that being trusted does not
imply being trustworthy, e.g. see [Gol06].
13These protocols in fact require channels which can buffer messages for virtually an indefinite amount of
time, thus merely delegating the “stateful-ness” to a different entity.
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